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I
INTRODUCTION

The public capital stock, commonly called infrastructure, has been allowed
to deteriorate to the extent that its lack of availability frequently constitutes a
serious impediment to economic progress. This lack of adequate public
capital results in part from a failure to maintain the public capital facilities
constructed in the past, and in part from the failure of public capital
investments to keep pace with needs brought about by growth. The solution
to both maintenance and expansion of infrastructure problems is more fiscal
resources. The traditional systems of infrastructure finance for both capital
and maintenance projects, however, have been unable to keep pace with need.
The result has been the deterioration of the public capital stock, which has
been well documented by Choate and Walter.' The focus of this article is the
recent approach many jurisdictions are taking to provide more fiscal resources
to capital projects. Impact exactions have gained popularity as an alternative
to traditional methods of infrastructure finance. Although such exactions do
not make any contribution to maintenance of existing facilities, they do
constitute available resources.
Although much of the now deteriorating capital stock was originally
financed by state and federal governments, these governmental units have
been reducing their role in funding infrastructure improvements. Local
governments have thus been forced to direct available fiscal resources toward
operating and maintaining the facilities that state and federal grants originally
paid for, leaving little to finance new construction. This reduction has
resulted in an increasing financial role for local governments at a time when
they have also been experiencing fiscal pressure.
The increased financial role for local governments was not reassigned
through any rational process but rather through inaction and
underappropriation. The federal and state governments, the traditional
sources of public capital finance, tend to derive most of their receipts from
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income and sales taxes. One substantial advantage of these sources is that
they automatically increase with both growth and inflation.
Local governments, however, must take positive action in the form of
property reassessments and tax and fee increases in order to augment their
revenues and assume this expanded role. The reason is due to the nature of
their tax base and the limited availability of alternative revenue sources.
Because local governments must rely heavily on taxes for revenues, local
governments are assuming a greater role in infrastructure finance. Thus,
fiscal issues have come to the forefront. Perhaps the best known fiscal issue is
the public resistance to a primary local governmental revenue source, the
property tax. The most significant effect of regulation as a means to
supplement tax sources has been in the manner and extent of the regulation
of new development.
Generally, local governments attempting to raise the money required to
make infrastructure improvements have been faced with a choice: imposing
the burden of higher costs on the general public with higher taxes or
burdening users with higher user fees. User fees have become a common
means of maintaining the existing capital stock. An example of this trend is
increasing motor fuel taxes. User fees as a source of funding for new capital
investment, however, are a recent occurrence. The bonding of revenues from
user charges is an attractive and frequently employed means of financing
revenue producing facilities. 2 This approach, however, has no applicability to
nonrevenue producing facilities such as public schools. Even in the case of
services or facilities that are revenue producing, there are serious problems in
utilizing general user fees to fund capital improvements. The lack of readily
available alternative (nontax) revenue sources has led local governments to
explore their police powers as a means of attaining the needed capital
investment. The obvious objective in utilizing regulation rather than taxation
is to avoid the necessity of tax or fee increases.
The police powers, including the power to regulate land development, are
delegated to local governments by the states. 3 The extent to which local
governments may exercise these powers to regulate development varies from
state to state. In general, local governments have broad grants of power to
regulate. 4 This power contrasts with the narrow delegation of the power to
tax. Increasingly, local governments have turned to their land regulatory
police powers to offset their inability to employ innovative methods of
5
taxation.
Even in municipalities where user fees are utilized to finance capital and
maintenance expenses, problems have arisen with the need to finance capital
expansion in the face of growth. New revenue bonds typically require
2.

R. VAUGHAN, REBUILDING AMERICA: FINANCING PUBLIC WORKS IN THE 1980's, at 44 (1983).

3.
4.

E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 3 (2d
J. METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING 16 (1955).

5.
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increased user fees for all users because of higher current construction and
interest costs. Thus, all users of a system will be charged higher user fees in
order to meet the capital needs of new users. Because local governments lack
'the delegated authority, they are typically prohibited from imposing a tax on
new users that would preclude the necessity of a general increase in user
charges. 6 The result has been that local governments in growing areas have
been required to impose higher taxes and user charges upon all taxpayers and
users.
There are two basic premises of exaction or payment-in-lieu systems under
the police power. First, it is contrary to the public health, safety, and welfare
for development to proceed more rapidly than the public capital stock can be
expanded. Second, imposing higher taxes or user charges upon existing
users to finance capital improvements that service new development results in
some loss to existing users of the beneficial use of their property.
It is well recognized that the availability of a sufficient public capital stock
is an important element in the economic development of a community as well
as an important component of quality of life. 7 It is also recognized that
insufficient capital stock is a valid basis for the denial of new development
under the police power." It follows, then, that owners of developing property
will benefit from public capital improvements because their property will
increase in value. The alternative would be a lack of adequate public capital,
which is a valid basis for denying development approval. The exaction or
cash-in-lieu payment, as a precondition for approval, follows from these
premises.
From the perspective of infrastructure needs, growth is much more than
new homes or similar types of physical improvements. Rather, growth means
an increase in activity of all forms that create the need for increased quantities
of public capital facilities. Three basic activity agents exist within a
community: firms, institutions, and households. 9 As any of these agents grow
in number or size, the community will experience more activity and thus
greater need for services and facilities. The concept of activity accounts for
many areas that, though declining in total population, nevertheless need
additions to the infrastructure base because they are growing in other
respects.
The general approach to defining infrastructure need has been to link all
facilities to population growth and to define that growth in terms of
residential population. This approach, however, deals with only one aspect of
growth in activity. Commuters and shoppers in a given jurisdiction who do
not reside there create needs while present in the community, similar to those
created by residents. A shopping center requires police and fire protection,
6. See, e.g., Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
7. See COMMUNITY BUILDERS COUNCIL, URBAN LAND INST., THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS
HANDBOOK 86-191 (1968).
8. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal
dismissed, 509 U.S. 1003 (1972).
9.

F. CHAPIN, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 226 (2d ed. 1965).
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road improvements, and the like, irrespective of whether any of the shoppers
or employees reside within the community. The same is true for office
buildings and factories. It is activity that must be served, and it is the service
of such activity that imposes the infrastructure improvement costs on local
governments.10

Increasingly, local governments have been turning to impact exactions or
payments in lieu (impact fees) as a means of financing the growing need for
capital improvements. Such approaches shift the incidence of the cost of such
improvements from the public to the developer. In turn, this shift can impose
the ultimate burden upon the developer, the purchaser, or the property
11
owner.
This shift in public policy has been met with frequent controversy and
litigation. Several states, most notably California, have responded with
legislation that authorizes impact taxes. 12 Most states, however, have not
authorized any form of taxation or similar means that will allow the imposition
of capital costs only upon new development. Local governments in these
states must utilize their police powers, rather than their taxation powers, to
shift the incidence of the burden of capital costs from existing tax and fee
payers.
It is important to view systems of impact exactions or payments in lieu
within the broader context of local governmental finance. All units of
government have found that the demand for governmental expenditures
tends to exceed the public's willingness to pay general taxes. This differential
has resulted in all levels of government tending to move toward user fee
approaches of finance.13 Although exactions may or may not constitute user
14
fees as such, exactions and user fees share a common heritage.
An alternative to local government's assumption of infrastructure capital
(and even maintenance) costs is the creation of special districts. For several
decades, special districts have been the most rapidly growing type of
government in the United States. Between 1942 and 1982, the number of
counties decreased by 9, the aggregate number of municipalities and
townships increased by 671 (1.9%), and the number of special districts
increased by 20,289 (240%). 15 A majority of the special districts (66.7%)
provide infrastructure-type services, 16 and are being used to handle problems
10. Chapin, Activity Systems and Urban Structure: A Working Scheme, 34 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 11
(1968).
11. J. NICHOLAS, STATE REGULATION/HOUSING PRICES 27-42 (1982).
12. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65970-65979 (West 1985); Juergensmeyer, supra note 5, at 31.
13.
See W. COLMAN, A QUIET REVOLUTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE: POLICY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES IN EXPANDING THE ROLE OF USER CHARGES IN FINANCING STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1983).

14.

Holland, User Charges in the Wake of Tax and Expenditure Limitations, in THE IMPACT OF FISCAL

RESTRAINTS:
15.

ALTERNATIVE FINANCING BY LOCALITIES 47 (1982).

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES 272 (1984).

16.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF GOV'TS PUB. No. 4,

OF MUNICIPAL AND TOWNSHIP GOVERNMENTS at XII

(1982).
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of financing new development. They have been used most extensively in
California, Texas, and Florida.' 7 Although the record concerning special
districts is somewhat mixed, they have proven to be most effective in dealing
with the needs of suburban development in a manner that does not impose
costs on the general community.
II
EXTERNALITIES AND IMPACT EXACTIONS

The economic role of the exercise of the police power in land use
regulation is the limitation of negative externalities or, as they are commonly
known, social costs.' Beginning with Euclid v. Ambler, 19 this role has been
interpreted to mean the exclusion of certain land uses that have the potential
of diminishing the beneficial use of property owned by surrounding residents.
The exclusion of industrial uses from residential areas represents the
traditional example. As land use regulations have evolved, it has become
recognized and institutionalized that even allowable uses, such as residential
development within residential areas, can impose negative externalities upon
surrounding areas. Thus, the same situation has arisen with respect to
allowable uses as did with industrial uses, except that it is not the use itself
that is the basis for the externality but rather the inability of the existing
capital stock to accept that development. For example, crowding of schools,
parks, and roads leads to a decline in the beneficial use of property in a
manner similar to smoke or odor from an industrial development.
III
THE EXAMPLE OF ROAD CAPITAL FINANCE

Roads present an excellent case in point. If the existing road system in a
given location operates at capacity, any additional traffic will diminish the
benefit to existing users-a classic negative externality. The obvious solution
to the traffic problem, one that will also eliminate the externality, is the
construction of additional roads. The finance issue focuses on which group,
among the several possibilities, should be financially responsible for the new
roads.
Given the various revenue sources available, there is a given quantity of
roads that can be built and a given quantity that can be maintained during an
identifiable period of time. These quantities are functions of the motor fuel
tax rate, the magnitude of growth, and the quantity and condition of roads to
be maintained. In order to focus attention on capital finance, assume that the
existing roads are in reasonable shape and do not require extraordinary
maintenance. There are two basic sources of road capital finance in a growing
17. DeHaven-Smith, Special Districts: A StructuralApproach to InfrastructureFinance and Management,
in INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE, supra note 5, at 59, 68.
18. Davis, Economic Elements in Municipal Zoning Decisions, 39 LAND ECON. 375, 379-86 (1963).
19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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community: motor fuel taxes paid by existing residents and motor fuel tax
increases resulting from growth. Of course, these sources can be
supplemental to general appropriations.
In 1967, the general cost of building one lane mile of road was $100,000,
exclusive of right of way. 20 The Highway Capacity Manual indicates that the
2
general capacity to accept traffic per lane mile would be 7,000 trips per day. '
Thus, in 1967, the capital cost per trip mile was $14.29. Given an average trip
length of 6 miles, the capital cost (to provide the needed road capacity) was
$85.74. A typical single-family home generates 10 such trips per day. 22 Thus,
the 1967 cost of road construction per single-family home was $857. In 1967,
23
the typical federal, state, and local motor fuel tax was 12 cents per gallon.
The 21,600 miles of travel resulting from the single-family home would yield
$172.80 annually in motor fuel taxes at 15 miles per gallon. Experience in
Florida has shown that 35% of the motor fuel tax revenues are available for
capital projects. 2 4 This experience is rather typical of many states. The result
is that $60.48 is available annually for road capital projects. In 1967, the
prevailing municipal interest rate was 3.98%, which would yield a capitalized
value of these annual payments of $944. It follows that, in 1967, the addition
of one single-family unit would contribute motor fuel taxes with the ability to
construct $944 worth of roads at a cost of $857.
The rate at which the community can accept growth (in terms of traffic) is a
function of the motor fuel tax rate, road construction costs, and interest rates.
In 1967, these fiscal parameters would have given a community the ability to
grow at an annual rate of up to 7.7% per year, when the capital allocations of
new and existing residents are aggregated. 25 As these parameters change, so
to does the community's ability to accept new traffic at an acceptable level of
service.
By 1986, the cost to construct a lane mile of road increased to $300,000
and the municipal interest rate rose to 8%.26 Using these figures, and holding
the motor fuel tax constant, the ability of a community to accept traffic growth
declined substantially. At a cost of $300,000 per lane mile, the per singlefamily unit cost was $2,571, and the annual motor fuel tax receipts remained
20.
21.

22.
23.

FLORIDA DEP'T OF TRANSP., 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 2 [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD., HIGHWAY CAPACITY MANUAL 130 (1965).
INSTITUTE OF TRANSP. ENG'RS, TRIP GENERATION 200 (3d ed. 1983).
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES 652 (1976).
24.

ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.

25. The growth-absorptive capacity of a local government is defined in terms of the relative
ability of the available capital receipts to finance needed improvements. The calculations herein are
based upon the following formula:
Absorptive Capacity = [Annual Revenue per Unit of Development/Cost
(capacity/average trip length)] X Daily Trips per Unit of Development.

per

Lane

Mile

Using 1967 costs of $100,000 per lane mile and a tax rate of $0.04 per gallon (applicable to capital),

the ability of an area to accept growth will increase at 5.85% per year. By 1986, with costs of
$300,000 per lane mile and a $0.04 per gallon tax, the absorptive capacity will have fallen to 1.95%.
Tax increases to $0.06 will increase the 1986 capacity to 2.93%

26.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 1986 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

333.
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at $172.80, with $60.48 being available for capital. The higher 8% interest
rate reduced the present value of this stream of future payments to only $646.
Consequently, the ability of a community to accept growth in traffic declined
27
from 7.7% to 2.1% per year.
Between 1967 and 1985, the federal motor fuel tax increased by 4 cents
and many states furthered that increase by an additional 4 cents or more. The
result is that annual motor fuel revenues have increased to a total of 20 cents
per gallon. Annual motor fuel receipts per single-family unit are therefore
$288, with $100.80 going to capital. At 8% interest, the present value of the
these payments is $1,076.
Costs having risen to $2,571 in 1986, the cumulative effect of the changes
to the road finance system is a situation in which new development still tends
to result in a deficit even after an increase in taxes. Without figuring in the tax
increases, a growing community could accept traffic growth at a rate of 7.7%
in 1967 and 2.1% in 1986. After tax increases are included in the calculation,
the rate at which a community could accept traffic increases to 3.6% per year.
Deficits per unit still result, however, and the ability of the community to
accept any growth is due only to the allocation of the capital portions of motor
fuel taxes from existing activity. If a community grows at a rate greater than
its absorptive capacity, the local government has four basic alternatives:
1.
2.
3.
4.

reduce, or allow for increased traffic to reduce, the level of service;
increase revenue through a further increase in taxes;
limit new access (new development) to the road system;
provide alternative financing for road improvements.

Both reducing the level of service and increasing taxes impose costs upon the
existing users of the system. Limiting new development will impose no direct
cost upon existing users, and implementing some new alternative may or may
not impose burdens upon existing users depending upon the method elected.
If the alternative is an impact exaction or in-lieu fee, then the incidence of the
burden will not fall upon the existing community.
Equity considerations come to the forefront when the rate of increase in
the cost of new roads (or any capital facility) exceeds the rate of increase in
the revenues available to build those roads, given that a decline in the level of
service is unacceptable. The relevant equity question is whether, on the one
hand, taxes or fees should be raised in order to finance the needed
improvements or whether, on the other hand, the new development should be
charged an amount sufficient to finance the needed improvements without
requiring tax or fee increases.
Table 1 shows metropolitan growth rates for the state of Florida. From
1960 to 1970, 3 of the 19 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA's) of Florida
were growing at a rate that exceeded their ability to finance road
improvements (5.8%). Moreover, 16 of the 19 MSA's were growing at a rate
that exceeded their unadjusted 1986 ability to provide roads (1.9%) during
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for an explanation of the method for determining
the revised absorptive capacity.
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the 197 0's. Even after including a 50% increase in the capital portion of the
motor fuel tax, 11 of the 19 MSA's are growing at rates greater than their
ability to provide roads (2.9%).

TABLE 1
POPULATION GROWTH OF FLORIDA METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL
AREAS

19601960

MSAS
Bradenton
Daytona Beach
Ft. LauderdaleHollywood
Ft. Myers
Ft. Pierce
Ft. Walton Beach
Gainesville
Jacksonville
LakelandWinter Haven
Melbourne
Miami
Ocala
Orlando
Panama City
Pensacola
Sarasota
Tallahassee
Tampa-St. Petersburg
West Palm Beach
Source:

1980

Population
1970

.1980

Growth Rates (%)
1960-1970
1960-1970

69,168
125,319

97,115
169,487

148,445
258,762

3.45
3.07

333,946
54,539
56,226
61,175
86,520
522,169

620,100
105,216
78,871
88,187
119,389
612,585

1,018,257
205,266
151,196
109,920
171,392
722,252

6.38
6.79
3.44
3.72
3.27
1.61

195,139
111,435
935,047
51,616
337,516
67,131
203,376
76,895
116,214
820,443
228,106

228,515
230,006
1,267,792
69,030
453,270
75,283
243,075
120,413
142,231
1,105,553
348,993

321,652
272,959
1,625,724
122,488
700,055
97,740
289,782
202,251
190,329
1,613,621
576,812

1.59
7.52
3.09
2.95
2.99
1.15
1.80
4.59
2.04
3.03
4.34

BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS RESEARCH, COLLEGE OF Bus. ADM., UNIV. OF

4.33
4.32

FLA., 1984

FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS.

The impaired ability to accept growth is a direct result of the erosion of the
road infrastructure finance system. This impaired ability, in the face of
growth rates that exceed the local governments' ability to accept them, results
in increased traffic congestion, postponement of road maintenance, and
higher taxes. It also leads to regulatory measures such as performance
standards, exactions in the form of approval conditions, and regulatory
impact fees. An interesting observation with respect to Table 1 is that the
MSA's that most exceeded their absorptive capacity have been among the first
Florida communities to implement systems of exactions and payments in lieu.
The Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood and West Palm Beach MSA's were the first to
adopt such programs in 1979, and were soon followed by Sarasota, Fort
Myers, Tampa, and Fort Pierce. Most of the other MSA's are now in the
process of developing such programs.
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Local governments in Florida have always had the option of raising their
single discretionary source of revenue, the property tax, as a means of paying
for road capital and maintenance costs. This option, however, has been
avoided because of the resistance to property tax increases. This resistance
has been felt in both public pressure to limit taxes and in legislation that limits
taxation. In 1985, the Florida Legislature passed legislation allowing local
governments to impose up to a six cent per gallon optional motor fuel tax to
finance road improvements. 28 Most local governments have made use of this
option. What was effectively a fifty percent increase in the motor fuel tax,
however, was simply insufficient to provide roads for the very rapid growth of
many areas in Florida. Florida local governments are still faced with the need
either to raise the unpopular property tax or to manage growth so that it
proceeds at a rate consistent with the community's declining ability to provide
services.
The managed growth alternative, frequently employed by local
governments, commonly includes exactions imposed on large-scale
development. This latter approach has not responded to the problem.
Within the rapidly growing state of Florida, only five to twenty percent of new
growth has been occurring within such large-scale developments. Attempts to
deal with infrastructure inadequacy by focusing only on large-scale
developments are bound to fail because of the dominance of small-scale or
"vested" developments. The alternative increasingly used is the impact fee,
which is paid by all new development regardless of its scale or its status with
respect to vesting.
IV
USE OF THE REGULATORY IMPACT FEE

Developers have frequently challenged attempts to bridge the
infrastructure finance gap with regulatory impact fees. Such litigation is
based, in part, upon the failure of local governments to receive authorization
from the legislature to impose what developers allege are really taxes.
Moreover, developers claim that regulatory impact fees are unfair because
existing developments did not have to pay such assessments.
Notwithstanding that these arguments may have merit, the fact remains that
municipalities need additional sources of revenue. The issue then becomes
who will pay. Given this dilemma, in Contractors & Builders Association v. City of
Dunedin, the Florida Supreme Court stated that a regulatory impact fee
imposed on a developer would be valid if: (1) new development actually
requires expansion of capital facilities; (2) the fee required does not exceed

28. Transportation Reform, Accountability and Cooperation Act, ch. 85-180, § 33, 1985 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. 719, 757-58 (West) (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 336.025(1)(a) (West
Supp. 1986)).
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the costs incurred by the local government; and (3) the fee revenues are
specifically earmarked and spent for the purposes collected. 29
These criteria have shifted the focus of the exaction process from costs to
benefits. This approach bears some resemblance to special assessments. The
resemblance to special assessments has become even greater since the courts
have required that the impact fee revenues be spent for the benefit of the
development paying the fees. 30 The prohibition against collecting fees higher
than costs, and the requirement that revenues be spent to benefit the fee
payer effectively preclude communities from charging "entrance" fees.
The Dunedin decision did not address the issue of defining the local
government's cost. In the 1986 road example above, there are two possible
definitions of a local government's cost. The total cost per single-family unit
is $2,571. 3 1 Is this cost the upper limit for a regulatory fee? The local
government will receive $60.48 annually to pay for roads. These payments
have a present value of $594. Local government's net cost is thus $1,977. It
then becomes necessary to determine what portion of the taxes received is
used to provide the facility that is the subject of the exaction. If a local
government ignores the various road taxes in assessing the exaction and also
retains those payments, the new development will be paying more than its fair
share.
Moreover, if the local government considers both the origin and the
destination of a vehicular trip in its calculation of the capital cost of the new
road, there must be adjustments for this apparent overcharge. An example
may be of assistance. Assume that a new development has 1,000 residential
units, 30,000 square feet of commercial area, and 10,000 square feet of
industrial area. The homes would be the origin of trips and the commercial
and industrial areas would be the destination. If the 1,000 homes generated
ten trips each with a length of six miles, total daily travel would be 60,000
miles. If, at the same time, 30,000 square feet of commercial area attracted
6,000 trips and the 10,000 square feet of industrial area attracted 4,000 trips,
total attracted travel would be 60,000 miles. The sum of the two would be
120,000 miles per day, which is exactly twice the actual new travel. Some
adjustment is required to compensate for this double accounting. Many
communities have elected to divide evenly a trip between the origin, the
home, and the destination,3 2 resulting in a gross cost of $1,286 and a net cost
of $989 for a single-family home. Such considerations are essential in order
to ensure that the local government does not impose charges that exceed the
actual cost of accommodating new development.
29. 329 So. 2d 314, 320-21 (Fla. 1976) (exaction deficient), reconsideredon appealfrom unpublished
remand, 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (amended exaction held legal), cert. denied, 370 So.
2d 458, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
30. SeeJordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 620-23, 137 N.W.2d 442, 449-50
(1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).

31.
32.

See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
See, e.g., Lee County, Fla., Ordinance 85-23 (July 31, 1985).
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Many other states find themselves in a position similar to that of Florida.
California has provided legislative authorization for certain impact fees,3 3 and
California courts have approved regulatory exactions and payments in lieu
where there has been a reasonable relationship between the required
conditions and the need imposed by new development. 34 Colorado and Utah
follow similar rules. 35 Statutory authorization does not guarantee success, as
indicated in the Emerson College v. City of Boston decision. 3 6 In that case, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down a statute authorizing a benefit
charge for fire protection. Many other states, however, will allow off-site
exactions if the facility exacted is used exclusively to benefit the individual
37
development.
Inasmuch as exclusivity of benefit is rarely the case, off-site exactions or
payments in lieu are used only in limited cases in these states. Most states that
follow the exclusivity-of-benefit rule are not rapidly growing and therefore do
not have to cope with problems of rapid growth. 3 8 The declining ability of
communities to accept growth, however, is apparently causing courts to
modify their holdings. A New York court prohibited local governments from
imposing requirements on new development except where the resulting
facilities were solely for the benefit of the residents of the particular
subdivision,3 9 but its decision was subsequently overruled. 40 As the inability
to maintain and expand the local infrastructure is increasingly perceived as a
problem, there may be more instances where restrictive requirements are
overruled.
V
WHO PAYS?

A central issue raised in the exaction debate is who pays the exaction? A
necessary first step in resolving this issue is to ask why exactions exist in the
first place. It has been argued that they exist primarily to protect existing
property owners from either a loss in the quality of public services or an
increase in taxes as a consequence of growth. 4' The protection of existing
33.

See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66477 (West 1985).
34. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638, 484 P.2d 606, 610,
94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
35. See City of Arvada v. City and County of Denver, 663 P.2d 611 (Colo. 1983); Banberry Dev.
Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
36. 391 Mass. 415, 462 N.E.2d 1098 (1984).
37. See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799
(1961) (local government can demand facilities only when need is specifically and uniquely
attributable to particular subdivision).
38. For example, Illinois follows the exclusivity-of-benefit rule, see Pioneer Trust, 22 Ill. 2d 375,
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40. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
41. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1987, at 101, 101-02.
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property owners, however, explains only why exactions exist and not which
individuals should pay the cost.
Exactions or payments in lieu are costs of producing new development,
but these costs differ from other such production costs as material and labor.
Exactions can be structured in such a manner that they are ultimately borne
by the developer. The developer, in turn, can shift this cost backward to the
property owner (in the form of lower land prices), or forward to the buyer (in
the form of higher rental prices). Thus, it is important to determine who
should pay.
To the extent that exactions exist to provide necessary facilities to support
new development, then property served by the facility will be the primary
beneficiary, for the availability of these facilities will be capitalized into the
value of the property. Because the existence of the facility will raise the value
of the property, the property owner should bear the burden of the exaction,
and the system should be designed in such a manner that the cost is shifted
backward in the form of lower land prices. On the other hand, to the extent
that the exaction is simply a means to capture some pro rata share of the cost
to provide a particular benefit, then the recipient of that benefit, the user or
buyer, should pay the cost. This scheme is also consistent with the user fee
approach, for it is the occupant of the developed property who is the user of
the facility. Alternatively, if the objective of exaction systems is to capture a
portion of presumably windfall profits received by the developer, then the
system should be structured so that the cost will be borne by the developer.
The developer is typically the agent who actually incurs the cost. To the
extent that the property is already owned by a developer, there is no
opportunity to shift the cost backward to a property owner. If backward
shifting is the goal and the system is so structured, then developers who
already own the land will bear the burden in the form of lower profits.
Even if the cost of building increases by the amount of an exaction, prices
will not necessarily increase to shift the cost forward either. The reason is that
competition, not costs, sets prices. To the extent that the buyer should bear
the ultimate burden, imposing the cost on the developer will shift the cost
forward to the buyer only in two cases: (1) where all developers must incur
similar exaction costs; and (2) where demand for new construction is
sufficiently inelastic to actually shift the cost forward. If the objective is to
impose the burden upon the ultimate user, then some form of special
assessment imposed at occupancy would be a better method than an exaction
or payment in lieu. In that case, neither property owners nor developers
would make the payment.
A predictable exaction system, one that substitutes performance standards
for in-lieu payments, has a greater likelihood of being shifted backward to the
property owner. This shift would occur only after some period of time. In the
interim, the developer would bear the final incidence of the cost. A uniform
exaction system that is not predictable (assuming it is possible to have a
uniform, unpredictable exaction) would not affect the property owner and
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would tend to be passed forward to the buyer. A nonuniform, unpredictable
exaction system falls on those developers who have little opportunity to pass
the cost either forward or backward. Such an exaction, which results in lower
profits, would discourage new development and could lead to shortages.
These shortages, however, would eventually result in higher prices that reflect
the manner in which the exaction is shifted forward. This result would only
occur if all forms of development were subject to the same exactions. If only
one or a limited number of developments was exacted, then the developer
would incur higher costs in building that type of development without an
opportunity to recoup those costs in the form of higher prices. Such a result
would discourage that type of development. The frequent application of
exactions only to large-scale development is an example of this approach. To
the extent that this approach to exactions discourages large-scale
development, the community loses the benefits of what is frequently
42
considered to be a preferable form of development.
Because the timing of the imposition of an exaction can affect the
magnitude of the burden and its ability to be shifted, another relevant issue is
the time for payment. There are several possible stages in the development
cycle when an exaction or payment in lieu may be imposed. The first
opportunity to require payment would be at the development approval stage.
Types of development approval include rezoning, plat approval, and site-plan
approval. Imposing an exaction as a condition to approval is the most
commonly used means of imposing an exaction, although typically application
is confined to on-site improvements. Off-site exactions, especially payments
in lieu, imposed at the development approval stage could have substantially
higher burdens than those imposed later in the development cycle. The land
development process can take many years. Any cash costs are capitalized into
the project, and any returns on such investments are received at the end of the
process. Such costs require interest payments, which go either directly to a
financial institution or are accumulated through achieving a calculated
investment return. For example, a $1,000 in-lieu payment for parks collected
at plat approval on a lot that will not be built upon for 5 years will entail the
$1,000 payment plus interest at, say, 12% (which, when compounded over the
5-year period, would equal $762) for a total cost of $1,762.
This situation can be remedied by allowing postponement of the payments
until some later point in the development cycle. 43 The building permits and
site-plan approval phases would present the next opportunities to require
payment. Finally, a municipality could impose a regulatory fee as a condition
for issuance of a certificate of occupancy. It is highly probable that fees
imposed at this point would be passed forward to the buyer. The building
permit phase represents the midpoint of the development process. A uniform
and predictable exaction system or payments in lieu imposed as a condition
for the issuance of the building permit could be passed backward to the
42.

R. BURBY III & S. WEISS, NEW COMMUNITIES, U.S.A. 7-16 (1976).
BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 5-192(e) (1981).

43. See, e.g.,
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property owner and also forward to the buyer. There is also a distinct
possibility, however, that the ultimate burden could fall on the developer if
market conditions preclude the possibility of passing the cost along to the
buyer in the form of higher prices, that is, if there is a large inventory of
unsold structures relative to demand.
Of those local governments that have imposed impact fees, the experience
of Sarasota County, Florida, is noteworthy. Sarasota County imposes a fee
(actually a special assessment) for roads and parks as a condition for issuance
of a certificate of occupancy. This charge is passed on to the buyer and is
actually shifted to the buyer at closing. The appearance of this charge on the
closing statement causes surprise and hostility toward the local government,
not to mention complications with closings.
Exactions are imposed, either as performance standards or payments in
lieu, based on the quantity and cost of facilities needed by the development.
No consideration is given to the ability to pay. A park impact fee of $500 per
single-family unit does not vary in accordance with the value of the unit or the
burden that this imposition places on the ultimate payer. To the extent that
the burden of the payment is passed back to the property owner or remains
with the builder, the exaction is arguably fair because those parties are willing
participants to the contract. To the extent that the burden of the payment
falls on the buyer, however, the exaction is undoubtedly regressive because it
imposes a greater financial burden on those with less ability to pay.
Although on-site exactions are widely used, payments in lieu and off-site
exactions are usually confined to more rapidly growing areas. Empirical
research on the ultimate burden of off-site exactions and payments in lieu has
concluded that, regardless of how the system is structured, the final burden
falls upon the buyer. Elliott found that the fees imposed in California
communities are frequently associated with housing price increases. 44 Black
and Hoben found that community growth management programs are
correlated with price increases in residential lots. 4 5 The studies undertaken in

a wide cross-section of communities all come to the same general conclusion
that exactions and other regulatory costs are shifted forward to the buyer.
These studies, however, have generally been undertaken in areas
experiencing rapid growth. It is quite possible that the ability to shift costs
forward is related more to the growing demand for housing than to any other
single factor. No studies have been undertaken that test exaction systems
across communities with varying rates of growth. According to economic
theory, the final burden of regulatory exactions would vary depending upon
the structure of the exaction system and the nature of the demand for new
construction. The empirical studies, however, indicate that the burden falls
solely upon the purchaser, at least in rapidly growing areas.
44. Elliott, The Impact of Growth Control Regulations on HousingPrices in California, 9 AM. REAL EST. &
ECON. A.J. 115 (1981).
45. Black and Hoben's findings are discussed in Weitz, Who Pays ifrastructureBenefit Charges-The
Builder or the Home Buyer?, in INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE, supra note 5, at 79, 85 (1985).
URB.
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VI
CONCLUSION

Developer exactions must be seen as a bargaining approach to dealing
with development approval. Developer exactions exist within the police
powers, however, and are therefore limited to regulating land development in
order to prevent public harm. To constitute a legitimate exercise of the police
power and an equitable method of cost recoupment, an exaction should be
restricted to three situations: (1) where capital improvements are required;
(2) where requirement payments do not exceed those necessary to correct the
deficiency; and (3) where revenues raised through in-lieu payments are
separated from the general fund and are spent to improve the needed
facilities. Otherwise, local governments would have the opportunity to charge
entrance fees as a means of reducing taxes and charges to the existing
residents at the expense of future residents.
Clearly, taxpayers should not be expected to subsidize new development.
Moreover, new development should not impose reductions in current
benefits, higher taxes, or increased user fees upon the community. To the
extent that the objective of exaction systems is to achieve an equitable
distribution of costs, the exaction should be designed to assure that the new
development pays its pro rata share in a community that is already paying its
pro rata share. Alternatively stated, the goal of exaction programs is to shield
existing residents, taxpayers, and facility users from the costs of growth.
Although these principles may be relatively simple, their implementation is
much more complicated. New development will pay property taxes and user
fees along with existing development. If some portion of existing taxes and
fees is dedicated to payment of past capital costs, new development will pay at
least a portion of the capital costs incurred to serve the existing community.
Some consideration of such payments should be incorporated into exaction
assessment programs. Otherwise, by imposing exactions or in-lieu payments,
a community can require new development to pay all of its capital costs and
then lower property taxes or user fees when the new development begins to
pay taxes and fees.
Exactions are designed both to improve the value of property and to
benefit users of the facilities. Because property value is increased by
construction of a road, park, or school, property owners should pay some
portion of the cost for the benefit they enjoy. A predictable system of
performance-standard exactions could achieve this end. Construction of
facilities, however, also benefits the users; users should, therefore, pay some
portion of their cost. This result could be achieved by imposing a special
assessment at occupancy. Given that both aspects of benefit are involved, it
follows that a complex system of exactions might be the proper approach.
Such an approach would impose exactions in the form of performance
standards for construction of facilities that tend to enhance property values at
an early stage in the development cycle, such as at the plat approval stage. If
these requirements are predictable, they would most likely shift backward to
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the property owner in the form of lower land prices. For the services and
facilities that are more user oriented, a predictable and uniform payment

occurring at or near the end of the development cycle would shift forward to
the buyer.
The fiscal condition of local governmental capital improvement programs
is a clear indicator that new approaches to infrastructure finance are
necessary. Exactions and payments in lieu are means of partially dealing with
infrastructure finance problems. But by no means should exactions be the
only solution because, as they currently stand, exactions are regressive.
Furthermore, to the extent that exactions in their current form grow as a
means to finance infrastructure improvements, local fiscal systems will
become more regressive. Given the current case law, legislative action will be
necessary to implement less regressive exaction systems.

